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Summary
The federal government has historically supported the open publication of
federally funded research results.  In cases where such results presented a challenge
to national security concerns, several mechanisms have been employed.  For
fundamental research results, the federal policy has been to use classification to limit
dissemination.  For advanced technology and technological information, a
combination of classification and export and arms trafficking regulation has been
used to inhibit its spread.  The terrorist attacks of 2001 have increased scrutiny of
nonconventional weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, and publication
of some research results have increased concerns over whether publication of
federally funded extramural research results could threaten national security.  
The current federal policy, as described in National Security Decision Directive
189, is that fundamental research should remain unrestricted and that in the rare case
where it is necessary to restrict such information, classification is the appropriate
mechanism.  Other mechanisms restrict international information flow, such as
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) that control export of items and technical information on specific
lists.  Both EAR and ITAR do not apply to sharing fundamental research results, so
long as they are not subject to any governmental prepublication review.
The areas where export regulation and classification have predominantly
occurred have been in mathematical, engineering, and physical sciences.  Other
contentious research areas, such as genetic engineering and manipulation, have been
overseen through scientists’ self-regulation and monitoring.  The 1975 Asilomar
conference produced a consensus statement on recombinant DNA research that
formed the basis for the National Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee.  Recent research publications that have raised national security concerns
have fallen outside of the areas traditionally regulated through classification and
export control, and it is unclear whether these mechanisms will be equally effective.
The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity is being established to aid in
determining whether proposed federally funded research presents a biosecurity threat.
Stakeholders do not agree on the best method of balancing scientific publishing
and national security.  Some believe that the current method of selective
classification of research results is the most appropriate.  They assert that imposing
new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research
results to terrorist groups is limited.  Others believe that self-regulation by scientists,
using an “Asilomar-like” process to develop a consensus statement, is a better
approach.  They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and
security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be
found.  Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might
potentially have security ramifications is third option.  Finally, mandatory review by
federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential
federally based alternative.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
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1 National security is defined in Executive Order 12356 as “the national defense or foreign
relations of the United States.”  Both broader and narrower definitions of national security
have been suggested as well.  For a discussion on this topic, see Arvin S. Quist, Security
Classification of Information. Volume 2. Principles for Classification of Information
(K/CG-1077/V2), (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory), September 1989,
Chapter 5.
2 Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and
recover from attacks that do occur.  Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for
Homeland Security, The White House, July 2002.
3 Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new
knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any
particular application or use in view.  Applied research is also original investigation
undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge.  It is, however, directed primarily towards
a specific practical aim or objective.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Frascati Manual, (OECD), 2002, p. 30.
Balancing Scientific Publication and National
Security Concerns: Issues for Congress
Introduction
Publication of scientific research results that might be used by terrorist groups
has led some policymakers to question whether the method used to control scientific
research results, namely classification, should be revisited.  The Administration,
legislators, and scientific professional societies are reexamining policies relating to
scientific information that might threaten national1 or homeland2 security.  In March
2002, executive branch agencies were instructed by Assistant to the President and
Chief of Staff Andrew Card to determine if government-owned information,
especially that regarding weapons of mass destruction, was being inappropriately
disclosed.  Also in March 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) promulgated a
draft regulation expanding information controls to basic and applied science research
and development.3  Scientific professional societies are engaged in developing self-
regulatory mechanisms to address the concerns of the national security community.
In 2003, at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, 32 editors of leading scientific journals issued a policy statement regarding
publication of research results that could be misused.  Additionally that year,  the
National Academy of Sciences held a meeting discussing whether current publication
policies and practices in the life sciences could lead to the inadvertent disclosure of
“sensitive” information to those who might misuse it.  In 2004, the National Research
Council issued a report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, which
recommended an oversight structure, based on institutional biosafety committees, for
research in select areas of concern.  Following some of the recommendations
CRS-2
4 Dual-use technologies are those technologies that have both a legitimate civilian and
military use.
5 National Academy of Sciences, Scientific Communication and National Security,
(Washington DC: National Academy Press), 1982.
6 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice, letter to Dr.
Harold Brown, co-Chairman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 1,
2001.
presented in the National Academies’ report, the Department of Health and Human
Services established in 2004 the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to,
among other things, advise the federal government on biosecurity matters.
Policymakers may wish to determine what changes, if any, should be made to current
government policy regarding publication of federally funded research results, and
whether the options currently under consideration adequately balance the concerns
and needs of the security and scientific communities. 
Since the 1950s, the United States has developed an established policy of
identifying, prior to publication, areas of basic and applied research where
information controls may be required.  This research, typically related to weapon
systems or nuclear technologies, may be designated classified and have strict
information controls placed upon it.  When fundamental research is not classified,
the government generally does not place other information controls on it.  
This policy remained essentially unchanged until the 1970s when controls were
developed on the export of domestically developed, advanced, dual-use technologies
and technological information.4  Under export control regulations, even if a
technology is barred from export, the fundamental, basic science underlying the
technology is generally exempt from controls and can be published in the open
literature.
In the early 1980s, foreign student and scientist access to technological
information that might fall under export control regulations became the focus of a
Department of Defense effort to restrict such information presented in classrooms
and conferences.  In 1985, following a report from the National Academy of Sciences
asserting that openness in science leads to stronger long-term security,5 President
Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), reiterating that
fundamental research results were to be controlled only through classification.
NSDD-189 continues to define federal policy on restricting the dissemination of
fundamental research results.6
Since that time, the conduct of science and the composition of the scientific
community have become increasingly international, and there have been growing
concerns about the effectiveness of export control regulations.  The international
spread and independent development of dual-use technologies has made the United
States less often a sole technology source.  Concern that export control regulation is
negatively impacting domestic business prosperity has led to attempts to lower the
trade barriers erected by export control.  Additionally, the presence of foreign
students and scientists in the United States has increased the availability of education
CRS-3
7 This report does not address the development of federal standards of usage for “sensitive,
but unclassified” material.  For more information on federal government use of “sensitive,
but unclassified” and efforts regarding standardization, see CRS Report RL31845,
“Sensitive But Unclassified” and Other Federal Security Controls on Scientific and
Technical Information: History and Current Controversy, by Genevieve J. Knezo.
and training in basic skills which may be transferred to other countries upon the
return of those individuals to their home countries.
Since the terrorist events of 2001, concern that open publication of scientific and
technological results may provide unwitting assistance to other nations or terrorist
groups in developing weapons of mass destruction has resurged.  Scientific research
is conducted in many disparate areas, and historically the areas where the balance
between scientific openness and national security required consideration have been
centered in the mathematical and physical sciences and their applications, such as
aerospace engineering, advanced computer technology, and cryptography.  Research
in biology – such as the origins of virulence, development of vaccines, and the
genetic manipulation of biological agents – has recently emerged as an area of
concern because of its potential relevance to biological weapons of mass destruction.
Whether the current method of only using classification to limit the dissemination of
fundamental research results is the best or most effective method of maintaining
national security is an open question.  It is unclear whether classification will be
effective when applied to research areas that have not historically been classified, nor
is it clear that a system of classified research will be embraced by scientists working
in these areas.
Several competing proposals regarding how to control federally funded research
results have been proposed, ranging from strict information control on all federally
funded research to maintaining the status quo.  Some scientific professional societies
have suggested that self-regulation, either by scientists themselves or through the
editors of scientific journals, would be an appropriate mechanism for limiting the
publication of research results that might aid terrorist groups.  Others have advocated
more formal government oversight of potentially contentious research.  The
development of a new category of “sensitive, but unclassified” information to protect
information which does not require classification, but may still have the potential to
damage national security, might encompass such research results.7  The potential
impact of these options raises much concern and debate.
A fundamental trade-off between scientific progress and security concerns is the
crux of the policy debate.  The scientific enterprise is based upon open and full
exchange of information and thrives on the ability of scientists to collaborate and
communicate their results.  On the other hand, this very openness provides potential
enemies with information that may allow them to harm U.S. interests.  The
technological advances arising from scientific breakthroughs contribute to economic
prosperity, but the openness required to continue this process creates risks, which
may be perceived as more acute since September 11, 2001.  What level of risk caused
via publication of scientific advances is acceptable in the eyes of policymakers and
the public?  How will controlling the publication of federally funded research results
increase safety?  If policymakers determine that more control of these sorts of
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8 R.J. Jackson, A.J. Ramsay, C.D. Christensen, et al., “Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4
by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and
Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox,” Journal of Virology, Vol. 75 (2001), pp.
1205-1210.
9 J. Stephenson, “Biowarfare Warning,” Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol.
285, No. 6 (2001), p. 725.
10 Robert Roos, “Scientists Research Antidotes to Super Mousepox Virus,” CIDRAP News,
November 6, 2003.
11 J. Cello, A.V. Paul, and E. Wimmer, “Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA:
Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template,” Science, Vol. 297
(August 9, 2002) pp. 1016-1018.
research results is warranted, what possible mechanisms could be used to oversee
these results?  
This report presents examples of scientific research results whose publication
raised concern regarding the threat they potentially pose to national security.  Past
and current information control mechanisms are discussed, along with current federal
policy concerning dissemination of fundamental research results through the open
literature.  Recent policy actions regarding dissemination of federal information and
federally funded research results are outlined, along with the responses these actions
have evoked from various professional societies and publishers.  The advantages and
disadvantages to potential policy actions addressing classification and other controls
over open publication of federally funded research results are also described.
Examples of Research Results of Concern
The publication of several scientific articles reignited concerns that information
published in the open literature may aid terrorist groups in developing weapons of
mass destruction.  Presented below is a selection of some more highly publicized
examples of such scientific articles.
In 2000, researchers at the Co-operative Research Centre for the Biological
Control of Pest Animals (CRC) in Australia genetically modified mousepox virus
while conducting rodent fertility research.  This modification unintentionally enabled
the virus to infect mice that had been previously vaccinated against mousepox.8  The
publication of this result was greeted with criticism due to its weapons potential.9
This experiment was repeated in 2003 by Dr. Mark Buller at the University of St.
Louis using funding supplied by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases.10
Another article widely viewed as having bioweapon potential was published in
July 2002.  Researchers at the State University of New York at Stony Brook
assembled functional poliovirus from chemical sequences ordered from a scientific
mail-order firm.11  Dr. Eckard Wimmer, the lead scientist, described the experiment
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12 Rick Weiss, “Polio-Causing Virus Created in N.Y. Lab: Made-From-Scratch Pathogen
Prompts Concerns About Bioethics, Terrorism,” The Washington Post, July 12, 2002.
13 For an overview of the policy implications of the successful synthesis of poliovirus, see
CRS Report RS21369 Synthetic Poliovirus: Bioterrorism and Science Policy Implications,
by Frank Gottron.
14 Sylvia Pagan Westphal, “Ebola Virus Could Be Synthesised,” New Scientist, July 17,
2002, accessed online at [http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99992555]
15 J. Parkhill, B.W. Wren, N.R. Thomson, et al., “Genome Sequence of Yersinia pestis, The
Causative Agent of Plague,” Nature, Vol. 413 (October 4, 2001) pp. 523-527.
16 J. Whitfield, “Black Death’s DNA,” Nature Science Update, October 4, 2001.
17 R. Seshadri, I.T. Paulsen, J.A. Eisen, et al., “Complete Genome Sequence of the Q-fever
Pathogen Coxiella burnetii,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, Vol. 100 (April 9, 2003) pp. 5455-
5460.
18 T.D. Read, S.N. Peterson, N. Tourasse, et al., “The Genome Sequence of Bacillus
anthracis Ames and Comparison to Closely Related Bacteria,” Nature, Vol. 423, 2003, pp.
81-86.
19 A.M. Rosengard, Y. Liu, Z. Nie, and R. Jimenez, “Variola Virus Immune Evasion Design:
Expression of a Highly Efficient Inhibitor of Human Complement,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 99 (June 25, 2002) pp.
8808-8813.
20 P.J. Lachmann, “Microbial Subversion of the Immune Response,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 99 (2002) pp.
8461-8462.
as graphic proof that bioterror agents can be made without a terrorist ever having
access to dangerous microbes.12, 13
Other scientific publications have been viewed as potentially aiding terrorist
groups or countries.  Publication of successes in “reverse genetics” has led some to
believe that other viruses could be constructed in the laboratory without having
access to actual virus ahead of time.14  In October 2001, the full genome of Yersinia
pestis, the bacteria which causes bubonic and pneumonic plague, was published in
the journal Nature.15  Simultaneous with the release of this article was the publication
of an accompanying news article in Nature Science Update that highlighted the
existence of “a debate about whether releasing genomic information for virulent
diseases, such as plague or smallpox, might aid malicious science.”16  The full
genome sequence of Coxiella burnetii, the causative agent of Q fever, was published
in Proceedings of the National Academies of Science of the United States of America
(PNAS) in April 2003,17 and the annotated genome of Bacillus anthracis, the
causative agent of anthrax, was published in Nature.18
Researchers at the University of Pittsburgh identified key proteins which
provide Variola major, the causative virus of smallpox, with high virulence.19
Accompanying this article was a commentary explaining how “the work is far more
likely to stimulate advances in vaccinology or viral therapy than it is to become a
threat to biosecurity.”20  Researchers published in the Journal of Clinical
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21 P.R. Coker, K.L. Smith, P.F. Fellows, et al., “Bacillus anthracis Virulence in Guinea Pigs
Vaccinated with Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed Is Linked to Plasmid Quantities and Clonality,”
Journal of Clinical Microbiology, Vol. 41 (March 2003) pp. 1212-1218.
22 A. Athamna, M. Athamna, N. Abu-Rashed, et al., “Selection of Bacillus anthracis Isolates
Resistant to Antibiotics,” J. Antimicrob. Chemother., Vol. 54 (2004) pp. 424-428. 
23 “Surfing for a Satan Bug.  Why Are We Making Life So Easy for Would-be Terrorists?”
New Scientist, July 20, 2002, p. 5.
24 Eric Lichtblau, “Response to Terror; Rising Fears That What We Do Know Can Hurt Us,”
Los Angeles Times, November 18, 2001, p. A1.
25 Alison McCook, “PNAS Publishes Bioterror Paper, After All,” The Scientist, 6(1), June
29, 2005.
Microbiology a potential cause of enhanced virulence for some strains of anthrax.21
The assessment of antibiotic resistance in select Bacillus anthracis isolates was also
identified as an article of potential concern.22
These articles have led some to question the wisdom of openly publishing
information that could be used to threaten national security.  An editorial in New
Scientist stated:
That this mind-boggling quantity of information is going to transform medicine
and biology is beyond doubt.  But could some of it, in the wrong hands, be a
recipe for terror and mayhem?23
Bioethicist Arthur Caplan from the University of Pennsylvania was reported as
saying:
We have to get away from the ethos that knowledge is good, knowledge should
be publicly available, that information will liberate us. ... Information will kill us
in the techno-terrorist age, and I think it’s nuts to put that stuff on Web sites.24
Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness
for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), when discussing the
decision of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America to publish an article on vulnerabilities of the milk supply chain,
reportedly stated through a spokesman that he regretted the journal’s decision to
publish the paper:
We recognize, of course, that this is an issue about which good and reasonable
people disagree.  But I must say that if the Academy is wrong, the consequences
could be dire and it will be HHS–not the Academy–which will have to deal with
it.25
Past and Current Controls on Information
Past examples of research excluded from publication in the open literature have
focused on military applications such as cryptography and nuclear weapons.  Prior
to U.S. entry into World War II, physicists in the private sector doing research on
CRS-7
26 Peter J. Westwick, “In the Beginning: The Origin of Nuclear Secrecy,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, (November/December 2000), pp. 43-49.
27 Rexmond C. Cochrane, The National Academy of Sciences: The First Hundred Years,
1863-1963, (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences), 1978, pp. 385-387.
28 Harold Relyea, Silencing Science: National Security Controls and Scientific
Communication, (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation), 1994, pp. 94-96.
29 An overview of the Asilomar conference can be read in Donald S. Fredrickson’s
“Asilomar and Recombinant DNA: The End of the Beginning,” found in Biomedical
Politics, (Washington, DC: National Academy Press), 1991, pp. 258-298.
nuclear fission voluntarily stopped publishing results in scientific journals, fearing
that they would provide crucial information to Germany’s nuclear bomb project.26
A joint National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council Advisory
Committee on Scientific Publications was established to restrict publication on
nuclear fission.  While the United States was involved in World War II, this
committee secured the cooperation of scientific journals in restricting the transfer of
select scientific information within the United States.27 
Nuclear power is another area where information controls have been instituted.
Private industry was permitted to explore applications of nuclear power under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.  Prior to this act, nuclear energy activities were
protected by the federal government with security and secrecy programs.  The federal
government retains authority over results which relate to atomic weapons, production
of special nuclear material, and use of special nuclear material in the production of
energy.28  Information developed in those areas, even if developed privately without
federal government aid, is regarded as “born classified.”
Genetic engineering and recombinant species were an area of great contention
in the 1970s, and there were calls for regulation of the methods for manipulating
DNA and of experiments containing genetically engineered species.  In response to
criticism and public pressure, a voluntary moratorium on such research was set.  In
1975, at the Asilomar conference center in Pacific Grove, California, discussion on
how scientists could self-regulate such research was held.  A consensus statement
regarding a voluntary moratorium on some types of recombinant research and an
increase in security and containment requirements for other research areas
successfully allayed many public concerns, and provided a uniform framework to
address such issues.  This consensus statement formed the starting point for research
rules developed by the National Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee, which was formed to oversee such research.29  
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30 White House, Office of the President, National Security Decision Directive-189, 1985.
31 Ibid.
32 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice, letter to Dr.
Harold Brown, co-Chairman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 1,
2001.
Current Federal Policy on Scientific Publication
In the United States, there has long been support for a policy of not restricting
publication of federally supported extramural and intramural research results, except
where classified for national security reasons.  This position was restated in 1985 by
President Ronald Reagan in National Security Decision Directive 189, which said:
It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum extent possible, the
products of fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this
Administration that, where the national security requires control, the mechanism
for control of information generated during federally-funded fundamental
research in science, technology and engineering at colleges, universities and
laboratories is classification. Each federal government agency is responsible for:
a) determining whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a
research grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if so, controlling the
research results through standard classification procedures; b) periodically
reviewing all research grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements for potential
classification. No restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or reporting of
federally-funded fundamental research that has not received national security
classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. Statutes.30
Fundamental research is also defined within NSDD-189:
‘Fundamental research’ means basic and applied research in science and
engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly
within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and
from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the
results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security
reasons.31
NSDD-189 has not been superceded and continues to be the government policy
regarding controls on federally-funded research results.  In the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 2001, then-Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed this position in a letter to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, by stating,
...this Administration will review and update as appropriate the export control
policies that affect basic research in the United States.  In the interim, the policy
on the transfer of scientific, technical, and engineering information set forth in
NSDD-189 shall remain in effect...32
Executive branch agencies have followed this general policy by requiring that
the results of agency-funded extramural research be published promptly and with
CRS-9
33 The National Science Foundation, National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant General
Conditions (GC-1), July 1, 2002, p. 17.
34 National Institutes of Health, NIH Grants Policy Statement (Rev. 03/01), U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, March, 2001, p. 122.
35 Office of Naval Research, Educational Institutions, Nonprofit Institutions, and For-profit
Organizations: Research Grant Terms and Conditions, U.S. Department of Defense, July,
2001, p. 6.
36 Some classified research is contracted to private industry or academic groups.
37 An example would be adaptive optics technology, which was declassified in 1991 and
now is used in astronomical telescopes.
wide dissemination.  For example, the National Science Foundation research policy
states:
NSF expects significant findings from research and education activities it
supports to be promptly submitted for publication, with authorship that
accurately reflects the contributions of those involved. It expects investigators
to share with other researchers, at no more than incremental cost and within a
reasonable time, the data, samples, physical collections and other supporting
materials created or gathered in the course of the work.33
Research performed with National Institutes of Health funding is also to be
disseminated to the public:
It is NIH policy to make available to the public the results and accomplishments
of the activities that it funds. Therefore, PIs [principal investigators] and grantee
organizations are expected to make the results and accomplishments of their
activities available to the research community and to the public at large, and to
effect their timely transfer to industry for commercialization.34
The Department of Defense also encourages the publication of research it funds.
For example, Office of Naval Research policy states: 
Publication of results of the research project in appropriate professional journals
is encouraged as an important method of recording and reporting scientific
information.35
In general, federal agencies appear to agree that there should be open publication
of research results when the research has been funded by taxpayer dollars.  The
exception is when research is classified.  Classified research projects, even those
performed by scientists outside of government laboratories, are not published in the
open literature, with information being transferred only between those who obtain
requisite clearance.36  Some classified research areas are later declassified, and the
advances developed in these programs used more generally.37  
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38 In addition to NSDD-189, Executive Order 12958, which was issued on April 17, 1995,
describes the general classification policy of the federal government.  This Order was
amended on March 25, 2003 via Executive Order 13292.  Section 1.4e states that scientific,
technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense
against transnational terrorism, may be classified, and, in section 1.7b, reiterates that basic
scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be
classified.
39 See, for example, Steven Aftergood, “Classified Research on Campus,” Secrecy News,
September 26, 2003, for a discussion of the debate occurring at the University of Alaska,
Fairbanks, regarding classified research.
40 Office of Academic Services, University Handbook, Kansas State University, June, 2001,
Section G.
41 D. Malakoff, “Universities Review Policies for Onsite Classified Research,” Science, Vol.
295 (February 22, 2002) pp. 1438-1439.
42 For example, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Colorado,
University of Virginia, and University of Michigan have each established mechanisms for
faculty members who wish to engage in classified research to apply to for permission from
the university administration on a case-by-case basis.
Mechanisms of Governmental Control
Current mechanisms for federal agencies to control the publication of federally
funded extramural research results include classification, export and arms trafficking
regulations, and specifications in federal contracts, such as prepublication review.
Classification
Generally, classification is to be used when it is necessary to control scientific
information.38  The advent of classified extramural research led most universities to
clarify their positions on acceptance of funding for classified research.  Significant
debate exists over the propriety of conducting classified research in an academic
setting.39  Some universities elect to not perform classified research on campus,
espousing that this is contrary to the founding beliefs of the university or their
university charters.  For example, Kansas State University maintains: 
...[T]he policy of the university is that classified research may not be carried out
under university auspices by any faculty member, unclassified professional
member, student, or other university personnel.40  
Universities that perform classified research typically establish research
facilities specifically to handle classified materials and research.  These research
facilities are often located off-campus.  Examples of such universities include the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Johns Hopkins University.41  Some
universities have developed mechanisms by which classified research may be
approved on a case-by-case basis.42  
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Export Controls
Export of Technologies.  Another federal control mechanism for private
research results occurs through export control and arms trafficking regulations.  The
Department of Commerce implements Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
which bar the export of items, technology, and technological information found on
the Commerce Control List to foreign countries without appropriate export license.43
The Department of State implements the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) which regulate the export of items, technology, and technological
information maintained on the Munitions Control List.44  
Export control laws primarily constrain the flow of technology and technical
information from the United States to other nations.  The EAR covers the transfer of
dual-use commercial goods, while ITAR is focused on armaments and military
technologies.  These regulations exist to prohibit the proliferation of certain specific
technologies for either national security or trade reasons.  
Because of the technological breadth of EAR and ITAR, private researchers,
using private funds, sometimes perform research in areas that fall within these
regulations.  For example, research relating to aerospace technology or cryptography
would fall under export regulation.  Universities performing basic research are
sometimes uncertain whether the research being performed at the institution falls
under EAR or ITAR restrictions.
Both EAR and ITAR possess exemptions for “fundamental research.”
Fundamental research is defined under ITAR as:
... basic and applied research in science and engineering where the resulting
information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific
community, as distinguished from research the results of which are restricted for
proprietary reasons or specific U.S. Government access and dissemination
controls. University research will not be considered fundamental research if: 
(i) The University or its researchers accept other restrictions on publication of
scientific and technical information resulting from the project or activity, or
(ii) The research is funded by the U.S. Government and specific access and
dissemination controls protecting information resulting from the research are
applicable.45
Universities generally rely on the fundamental research exclusion to exempt the
research performed there from export control.  If the university research is not
exempt through the fundamental research exclusion, export licensing must be
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obtained and information controls with respect to foreigners performed.  Failure to
obtain such a license can result in prosecution and large fines.
Export of Information.  A further complication to export regulation is the
concept of a “deemed export.”  A deemed export is transfer of information, not
physical items, to a foreign national from select countries without first obtaining an
export license for that technology.  This provision has been especially troubling for
universities, as foreign students and researchers who attend graduate-level classes
may be exposed to information relating to technology which falls under export
controls.
There have been cases where export control of information and scientific
research have coincided.  In the 1980s, research papers were removed by the
Department of Defense from a scientific convention because foreign nationals
ineligible for export licenses would be attending, and other conventions were held
in private session, to avoid violation of the deemed export aspect of these
regulations.46  Some universities have reported problems in collaborations with
foreign researchers, and cited, as an example, difficulty in transferring some
technologies developed by foreign graduate students to industry.47
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) has not been reauthorized.
As a consequence, President George W. Bush invoked the International Economic
Emergency Powers Act (P.L. 95-223) to maintain export administration regulation.
While the International Economic Emergency Powers Act continues export
administration regulation, the penalties for violating this act and the enforcement
authority granted under this act are less than those under the Export Administration
Act of 1979.48
The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) created another mechanism to block
certain foreign nationals from obtaining specific information.  Access to or
information about biological and toxin agents on the “select agent” list49 is barred to
individuals, including students, originating from countries which support terrorism.
Under the USA PATRIOT Act, universities are charged with improving security and
access controls to select agents, and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188) requires sites with select
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agents to keep a current inventory of those agents and register their possession with
the Department of Health and Human Services or with the Department of
Agriculture, depending on the nature of the select agent.
Most universities generally reconcile their dual roles, that of providing
educational and research opportunities to their students while simultaneously
remaining in compliance with the limits of export regulations, by relying on the
fundamental research exclusion.  Some universities affirm their role as disseminators
of knowledge and do not identify the nationality of students attending classes, citing
the incompatibility of closed classrooms with their academic charter.50
Prepublication Review
Some federal funding agencies, for example, the U.S. Army Research
Laboratory, Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Energy, and the Federal
Aviation Administration, occasionally incorporate publication restrictions in the
terms and conditions of their research contracts when the area of research either may
have potential defense applications or contain sensitive material.51  In general, these
restrictions have not been applied to entire research fields, but, instead, have been
targeted at research considered to be of import or relevance to national defense or
where portions of a contract may contain classified information.  An example would
be an instance at the University of Minnesota where a prepublication review clause
was required in a sub-contract performed by the university.  Even though no
classified information was handled by the University of Minnesota, classified
material was present in the main contract, and prepublication review to determine no
classified material appeared in any open publication was required.52 
University administrators have been reportedly uneasy about such
prepublication review clauses within funding vehicles.  Officials at Duke University
reportedly renegotiated and rejected contracts that had prepublication clauses inserted
into them by the Department of Defense.53  Administrators at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology have refused contracts including prepublication review
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language.54  While prepublication review clauses within Department of Defense
funding vehicles have caused concern among the academic community that they may
violate NSDD-189, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP), Dr. John Marburger, has stated that the Department of Defense use of
prepublication clauses in contracts has been consistent with prior policy.55  Dr.
Marburger requested that the academic community provide OSTP with examples of
such clauses.  The Council on Government Relations and the American Association
of Universities prepared a joint report submitted to OSTP documenting 103
prepublication clauses presented over a six month period to a sample of 20
universities.56
Policy Actions
The catastrophic terrorist attacks of 2001 led to an executive branch
reevaluation of the treatment of government-owned information.  In the wake of
these events, many government agencies evaluated information which was available
to the public through government websites and began to reassess documents that had
recently been declassified.57
The Card Memorandum
This process was marked by a memorandum on March 19, 2002 sent by
Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff Andrew Card to executive branch
departments and agencies.58  This memorandum became known as the “Card memo.”
It cautioned that information possessed by the federal government which could be
reasonably expected to assist in weapons of mass destruction development or use
should not be inappropriately disclosed.  Additionally, the guidance contained within
the Card memo reinforced the need to protect “sensitive, but unclassified”
information related to homeland security.
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The term “sensitive, but unclassified” was not defined in the memorandum and
it is not clear how sweepingly construed this category might be.59  Further guidance
regarding the use of this category is found within the memo itself:
The need to protect such sensitive information from inappropriate disclosure
should be carefully considered, on a case-by-case basis, together with the
benefits that result from the open and efficient exchange of scientific, technical,
and like information.60
Several comparable, but still dissimilar, definitions of “sensitive, but
unclassified” are in use at different agencies.  The Department of State describes
“sensitive, but unclassified” information as:
...information which warrants a degree of protection and administrative control
that meets the criteria for exemption from public disclosure set forth under
Sections 552 and 552a of Title 5, United States Code: the Freedom of
Information Act and the Privacy Act.61
The Department of Energy’s use of “sensitive, but unclassified” is described as:
Information for which disclosure, misuse, alteration or destruction could
adversely affect national security or government interests.  National security
interests are those unclassified matters that relate to the national defense or
foreign relations of the Federal Government.  Governmental interests are those
related, but not limited to, the wide range of government or government-derived
economic, human, financial, industrial, agricultural, technological, and law
enforcement information, as well as the privacy or confidentiality of personal
information provided to the Federal Government by its citizens.62
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The Department of Defense maintains several types of controlled, unclassified
information.  The Department of State category of “sensitive, but unclassified” is a
document designation comparable to For Official Use Only.63  The criteria for
allowing access to For Official Use Only and “sensitive, but unclassified”
information are the same.  The Department of Defense describes For Official Use
Only as:
... a designation that is applied to unclassified information that may be exempt
from mandatory release to the public under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).64
The Department of Defense Draft Directive
The Department of Defense requires a developed and documented plan for the
protection of information important to prolonging the effectiveness and lifetime of
acquired weapons systems for each acquisition program.  Under current policy, basic
and applied research funded by DOD is not required to have these information
protection plans.  Coincident with the issuance of the Card memo, DOD presented
new draft regulations in March 2002 for protecting research and technology within
the DOD.65  The DOD draft regulation proposed to extend the requirement for
acquisition programs to basic and applied research, both intra- and extramural, and
would include the possibility of prepublication review of all research results funded
by DOD. 
The academic community, as well as some personnel from the Department of
Defense, were highly critical of these draft regulations.66  One criticism forwarded
was that, since any research, even basic and applied fundamental research, performed
under Department of Defense auspices might be expected to have an impact on some
weapon system’s performance, all research results obtained would be categorized as
sensitive, unclassified information.67  As a result, all research funded by the
Department of Defense would require prepublication review.  Another criticism was
that, if plans for prepublication review of research results were developed, they could
undercut established policy regarding fundamental research as developed in NSDD-
189.  Some suggested that it would become possible to be held criminally liable for
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publishing unclassified research results as a consequence of the proposed
regulation.68  In the wake of such criticisms, the draft proposal was removed.
Congressional Action
Following the publication of the poliovirus research results, Representative
Dave Weldon introduced H.Res. 514 into the 107th Congress, which criticized the
publishing of research potentially compromising national security.  Subsequently, the
House of Representatives’ Committee on Science held a hearing on October 10,
2002, titled “Conducting Research During the War on Terrorism: Balancing
Openness and Security” where testimony related to methods to control dissemination
of sensitive scientific results was provided.  There Dr. Marburger stated that the
White House was revisiting treatment of sensitive homeland security information
primarily for application to critical infrastructure and law enforcement information,
rather than scientific results.  Dr. Marburger said: 
I’m aware that there is an impression that the administration is considering a
policy of pre-publication review of sensitive federally-funded research.  This is
incorrect–this is not the thrust of the considerations, and it’s important to note
that this process is in the formative stage.69
Additionally, Dr. Ronald Atlas, President of the American Society for Microbiology,
stated that some information which might prove valuable for new drug therapies or
vaccines could also be used maliciously to increase the danger of a pathogen.70  Dr.
Atlas voiced his support for a self-imposed code of conduct and oversight.71  Dr.
Atlas said:
If policy measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring pathogens, equipment, and
technical information are not crafted with great care, they may have a
significantly adverse effect upon critically important research activities.72
The Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) created the Department of
Homeland Security, within which many research and development functions relating
to homeland security were aggregated under a Science and Technology directorate.
The Science and Technology directorate is responsible for researching, developing,
and deploying biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological countermeasures.  It
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also has management of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency,
which funds extramural homeland security research.
How homeland security information shall be handled by the Department of
Homeland Security is further described in the Homeland Security Act.  While to the
greatest extent practicable, the results of research funded by the Department of
Homeland Security are to be unclassified,73 the President is also instructed to:
prescribe and implement procedures under which relevant Federal agencies ...
identify and safeguard homeland security information that is sensitive but
unclassified. ... The President shall ensure that such procedures apply to all
agencies of the Federal Government.74
Congress has held many hearings to perform oversight of the Department of
Homeland Security.  Issues raised in these hearings indicate that some policies are
not yet in their final form.  Since extramural scientific research funded by the
Department of Homeland Security might be reasonably expected to also have security
ramifications, an explicit policy relating to publication of such sensitive but
unclassified information will likely be needed.
Response of Professional Societies
Scientists are divided about how to balance scientific openness and national
security concerns.  While recognizing that security concerns are valid, some scientists
assert that the value of publication of research results is greater than the potential
risks.  Others state that publication of select research results is troublesome and that
mechanisms for determining which research results fall into this category and
addressing publication of these results need to be determined.
The American Association for the Advancement of Science, the professional
organization which publishes Science, has implemented a formal policy on how to
deal with potentially dangerous reports.75  The American Society for Microbiology,
a professional organization which publishes many scientific journals, including the
Journal of Virology in which the mousepox article was printed, has received requests
by authors to be allowed to omit certain information from their submissions.76  By
omitting such information, the experiments described in the article would be much
more difficult to reproduce, perhaps impossibly so.  
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The American Society for Microbiology has adopted the position that all
information necessary to reproduce an experiment must be included in any
submission for publication.  Former American Society for Microbiology president,
Dr. Ronald Atlas, testified:
Omission of materials and methods from scientific literature would compromise
the scientific process and could lead to abuses as well as the perpetuation of
errors.  Independent reproducibility is the heart of the scientific process.  Even
within the context of heightened scrutiny, research articles must be published
intact.  If scientists cannot assess and replicate the work of their colleagues, the
very foundation of science is eroded.77
Recognizing as valid the concern that scientific information in journals might
be inappropriately used, the American Society for Microbiology has developed and
established new policy guidelines for reviewers and editors of their journals.  These
new guidelines establish a procedure for special review of submissions concerning
select agents and for those submissions which reviewers feel may possess the
potential for inappropriate use.78  In July 2002, Dr. Atlas requested that the National
Academy of Sciences convene a meeting of journal editors to address the developing
situation.79 
The Presidents of the National Academies released a joint statement and
background paper which avers that the federal government should continue its
current practice of classification and not further develop a less well-defined category
to encompass sensitive research results.80  They asserted that scientific creativity and
national security would both be lessened if clear distinctions are not drawn between
areas where open publication is acceptable or not.  They also emphasized that wide
dissemination of research results and peer review are important aspects of research
science.81 
A meeting entitled “Scientific Openness and National Security” was held at the
National Academy of Sciences on January 9, 2003.82  It addressed some aspects of
the debate regarding scientific publication and national security.  Members of the
academic scientific community, the non-profit community, and the federal
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government met for a day-long symposium identifying the significant contentious
issues.  
At this meeting, Dr. Marburger reiterated that NSDD-189 continues to define
policy for publication of federally funded research results.  He suggested that
research should be designated as classified prior to awarding a federal grant or
contract, and that the need for deviation from this policy should be uncommon.  He
also stated that previous precedents of control in the physical sciences may not
provide adequate guidance for bioterrorism.83  Dr. Penrose Albright, then of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Homeland Security, also
stated that an articulated and defensible criteria for inappropriate research, able to
distinguish dangerous and benign research results, combined with a mechanism for
identifying articles containing dangerous but valuable information would be well
received by the Executive Branch.84
While consensus was not achieved among the attendees regarding the potential
solutions, there was general agreement that a growing dialogue between the scientific
and security communities would aid in satisfying community members’ concerns.
Towards this goal, the National Academy of Sciences and the Center for Strategic
and International Studies convened a two year, joint Roundtable on Scientific
Communication and National Security.  Both the scientific and security community
were invited to informally discuss, and potentially develop, solutions to the tension
over publication.85  This led to the formation of a Commission on Scientific
Communication and National Security by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.  This Commission published a white paper in 2005, recommending that the
federal government maintain NSDD-189 and that research institutions establish
mechanisms to ensure informed compliance with applicable regulations regarding
dissemination of scientific information.86
Journal editors described the new procedures put in place for Science and
American Society for Microbiology journals and cited the relatively small percentage
of articles that were considered potentially dangerous.87  Dr. Donald Kennedy, editor
of Science, suggested the identification of an informal group of qualified security
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representatives that would advise journal editors upon their request.88  Dr. Nick
Cozzarelli, editor for Proceeding of the National Academies of Science of the United
States of America, described the difficulties in identifying published research results
for which security concerns would override their scientific value.
At the American Association for the Advancement of Science’s 2003 Annual
Meeting in February 2003, 32 journal editors and scientist-authors issued a statement
calling for renewed vigilance and personal responsibility for potentially dangerous
research presented to them for publication.89  This joint statement, which evolved
from meetings following the National Academies’ meeting, provided the base for
subsequent announcements in Science, Proceeding of the National Academies of
Science of the United States of America, and the British journal Nature affirming
editorial policy to both deal responsibly and effectively with security issues while
maintaining the integrity of the scientific publishing process.90  It has been asserted
that the joint statement should be understood as augmenting, but not supplanting,
existing editorial policy at the signatory journals.91
The American Society of Microbiology’s guidelines for publishing potentially
contentious research have been tested with the publication of a manuscript in March,
2003 in the journal Infection and Immunity.  This paper described the effects of
proteins that accompany botulinum toxin during natural production and assessed the
proteins’ effects when inhaled.  Upon receipt of the manuscript, editors requested that
some portions of the paper be modified, in order to allay the editors’ security
concerns.92
The National Academy of Sciences issued a report which recommended that the
policies of NSDD-189 be continued and that other mechanisms should be developed
to address the difficulties of assessing and responding to contentious research.93  The
report identified seven research areas where results might pose a security concern,
and advocated that proposed research in these areas be reviewed, and potentially
rejected, by a committee, specifically the institutional biosafety committee within
each research institution, before the research is performed.  Thus, research of concern
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could be identified and weighed before results were generated.  Editors and
publishers would continue to exercise their professional judgement in the publishing
of manuscripts, without federal review or requirements.
Response to this proposal has been mixed.  While many in the scientific
community have supported this framework as an appropriate balance of scientific
self-regulation and federal advisory oversight, others have criticized the proposal for
not being legally binding or requiring such review of government or industrial
research.94  As an example of the limitations of the National Academies proposal,
critics refer to the open discussion of mousepox research results by Dr. Buller at a
biosecurity convention in Geneva, Switzerland.95 
Department of Homeland Security
The Department of Homeland Security has not, as of this writing, developed the
methods by which potentially contentious extramural research results will be
identified and handled or publicly disseminated policies regarding these results.
Secretary Ridge, in remarks to the Association of American Universities in April
2003, has stated that the federal government continues to uphold NSDD-189, and that
he does not plan to apply sensitive but unclassified or sensitive homeland security
information guidelines to federally funded research.  Instead, sensitive homeland
security information and sensitive but unclassified information would only be
information that the federal government already possesses.96
The Undersecretary for Science and Technology Charles McQueary has
reportedly voiced his views on the treatment of scientific research results.  At the
American Association for the Advancement of Science Colloquium on Science and
Technology Policy in April 2003, Undersecretary McQueary reportedly told the
audience that scientific organizations should establish their own criteria for
prepublication review of risky  research articles and that scientists and journal
publishers should set the bar for themselves.97  
It has been reported that the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency follows a Department of Defense model for quasi-classified broad agency
announcements.  Jane Alexander, deputy director of the Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency reportedly said that in some circumstances
information may be held back from broad agency announcements in order to avoid
CRS-23
98 Judi Hasson, “Research Arm Puts Lid on Contracts,” Federal Computer Week, August 14,
2003.
99 Department of Health and Human Services, “HHS Will Lead Government-wide Effort to
Enhance Biosecurity in "Dual Use" Research,” Press Release, March 4, 2004.
100 Dual-use research is defined as biolgoical research with legitimate scientific purpose that
may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or national security.
Department of Health and Human Services, National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity Charter, March 4, 2004.
101 For more information on the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, see online
at [http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/].
revealing vulnerabilities.98  The criteria for these circumstances has not been made
publicly available.  Whether research results arising from such broad agency
announcements could be freely published has not been made clear.
Department of Health and Human Services
Following the publication of Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism,
the Department of Health and Human Services announced the establishment of a
National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSABB), building on several of
the National Academies’ recommendations.99  The NSABB is, among other duties,
to provide advice, guidance, and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of
dual-use research.100  While the NSABB is managed and supported by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), it is to advise the Secretary of HHS, the Director of NIH,
and the heads of all federal departments and agencies that conduct or support life
sciences research.
The NSABB is composed of not more than 25 non-federal voting members
appointed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in consultation with the
heads of other federal departments and agencies conducting life sciences research.
It also contains non-voting ex officio federal members who represent agencies and
departments that conduct or support life sciences research.101
Policy Options
The balance between publication of federally-funded research results and
protecting national security raises numerous questions, such as:  Should there be
regulation of the publication of federally-funded research results?  Is the potential
impact on scientific quality, productivity, and advancement resulting from
publication controls worth the added potential security gained through such controls?
How might relevant policy be uniformly employed by all agencies of the federal
government?  Should such policy vary by scientific and technical disciplines?  At
what stage, if any, of the civilian research process might regulation or restriction
occur?  How much authority, if any, does the federal government have over the
publishing of research results developed through private funding?  How might
development or implementation of such authority introduce first amendment
conflicts?  Since science is an increasingly international discipline, how would
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national security concerns regarding federally funded research results be
implemented in a global context?  How might the federal government encourage
scientists to develop guidelines for self-regulation?  Given the international nature
of scientific publication, might self-regulation by domestic publishers cause sensitive
research results to be published in international journals rather than domestic
journals?  How might Congress provide oversight of this issue with respect to
extramural research and development funded by the Department of Homeland
Security?
Maintaining the Status Quo
Some in the scientific community advocate that the status quo, where the
mechanism for blocking publication of federally-funded research results is
classification, should remain the federal government’s policy on controlling research.
They assert that this mechanism has been sufficient in the past, and that the vigor of
scientific research could be unduly, and perhaps seriously, impeded if new controls
were developed and added.  Advocates of classification assert that, with the addition
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services,102 the Secretary of Agriculture,103 and
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency104 to the list of those
persons authorized to classify information, the federal government has greater
capacity to identify information for classification.  They assert that, in line with
NSDD-189, information which is not classified should be freely publishable and
distributable.  Advocates of this position claim that areas of proscribed research
should be well defined and protected by strong barriers, such as those provided under
classification.  
Advocates of retaining the status quo also cite substantial concern about the
impact of publication controls on science, especially in biological sciences.105  Some
have claimed that there would be a flow of scientists out of contentious research
areas into areas where there is less concern about the legal ramifications of their
work.106  Others have spoken of a general slowdown and decline in scientific
endeavor as the collaborative aspect of research becomes impeded.107 
Additionally, some scientists believe that an unimpeded flow of scientific
information is important to maintaining national security.  They assert that national
security will be increased if many researchers have access to information that may
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lead to new vaccines, detectors, and treatments, or conversely, that impeded access
may limit the development of countermeasures.108  Dr. Paul Keim, a scientist at
Northern Arizona University, stated:
If the Bacillus anthracis genome had not been released, we would not have been
able to develop the high-resolution system that is currently so important [to the
investigation of the anthrax attacks].109
On the other hand, advocates for changing the current system contend that
scientists are currently making available to terrorist groups information that can be
used to harm the populace.  Classification is not applied to information already
published in the open literature and research results that threaten national security
may arise from normally unclassified fields.  Advocates of changing the current
system assert that classification is insufficient to stop dissemination of such
information.  These proponents claim that the continued publication of such
information will harm national security, and that changes should be made so that
such federally funded research results can be classified before it is distributed.  Some
policymakers have also asserted that the current classification system may not be
appropriate for all sciences.  They emphasize the difficulties in clearly defining what
aspects of biological research should be subject to regulation,110 and that, unlike other
classified research areas, much of microbiology is performed outside of the federal
government.111  They suggest that classifying basic biological research might be
necessary for homeland security, but also might unduly restrict future applied
research.  Thus, they claim a different method for handling such results may be
necessary.112  
Advocates for adjusting the current system also assert that information
published in scientific journals may undermine biodefense efforts.  For example,
publishing which portion of a pathogen’s genome is used in a new biodetection
device could inform  terrorists how to create a pathogen which would avoid detection
by that method.113, 114 
The development of export control regulation may be indicative of ways that
science and security measures can be developed in a mutually acceptable approach.
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In these areas, the concerns of national security are met while simultaneously
allowing research to continue.
Self-Regulation by Scientists
While many individual scientists may identify reasonable and valid concerns
regarding the potential inappropriate use of information in scientific journals,
opinions vary about how to best address these concerns.  Some have advocated a self-
policing framework where scientists regulate themselves through a combination of
ethical agreements and publishing oversight.115  They claim that scientists are in the
best position to determine the threshold for responsible science and to respond to new
scientific developments.  As was shown through the experience of the National
Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, amendment or
adjustment of regulation and rules related to science is often needed, as the subject
matter continues to evolve and progress.  
Several mechanisms are possible within a self-regulating framework.  One
might involve review boards within institutions to assess research results.  Much
research involving human subjects, for example, is governed by local institutional
review boards.  A board’s purview generally extends to all human research at the
institution, irrespective of funding source.  Although required by the Public Health
Service Act and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for certain human
experimentation, the boards at extramural research institutions are not federal
entities.116  These institutional review boards have the ability and authority to
approve, require modifications within, or disapprove research projects.  Similar
review boards established within research facilities could be given the role of
screening manuscripts in a formal or informal manner prior to their publication.
Another possibility would be to convene a new “Asilomar-like” conference,
where members of the scientific and national intelligence communities, along with
public input, come together and craft codes of conduct which will satisfy the varying
needs of these disparate groups.117  By doing so, a framework could be developed to
identify sensitive research results and provide alternate dissemination routes.118  
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NIH National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Director Anthony
Fauci has voiced support for the above proposals.  During an address at the World
Medical Association meeting in October 2002, he suggested the formation of a panel
to determine the appropriateness of certain types of biomedical research and stated:
There should be a committee – a combination of academics and societies and
perhaps journal editors – to discuss [publication], so if there is a question in the
mind of someone, you can bring it to a body who can, in an unbiased way, give
you an idea about whether or not you should [publish].119
Whether scientific researchers would be able to properly weigh the security
concerns of research results is uncertain as well.  For example, Dr. Stephen Morse,
in endorsing the idea of an Asilomar-like conference, pointed out:
Scientists are not in the age of innocence anymore.  And they should be aware
of the moral implications of what they’re doing.120
Some have maintained that the natural inclination of scientists is to err on the side of
openness and publication,121 while others posit that since the science and security
communities are separated, trust in the actions of the opposing community is difficult
to develop.122  Other complications to self-regulation exist as well.  As scientific
research has become more international in scope, it would be necessary for such a
self-regulatory framework to be adhered to on an international basis.  Without the
agreement of international scientists to maintain similar codes of conduct,
contentious research results generated by international scientists would continue to
enter the open literature.
The NIH guidelines developed out of the Asilomar conference are generally
followed on an international level, but the scientific community is much larger now
than in the 1970s, and developing agreement among such a community may be more
difficult to achieve.123  Genetically modified foods and stem cell research are
examples of biological research areas around which a community-wide, international
consensus has not evolved.
The National Research Council report Biotechnology Research in an Age of
Terrorism provides recommendations for a potential self-regulatory mechanism.  It
identifies seven areas where “experiments of concern” might exist, and recommends
that experiments within these areas be reviewed by an institutional biosafety
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committee to determine whether the experiment presented some degree of concern.
The institutional biosafety committees would thus provide an initial review of
proposed experiments.  If further review or consultation was needed to determine
whether an experiment was of concern, then the experiment could be referred to an
expanded Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee or to a higher authority for
adjudication.124  The establishment of the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity may be interpreted by some to fulfill this role and function, but issues
regarding the authority and scope of the NSABB have yet to be fully resolved.
Regulation by Publishers
The newly implemented editorial guidelines, either those developed by the
American Society for Microbiology or others announced at American Association for
the Advancement of Science meeting, for handling the results of potentially sensitive
research may be models for other publishing houses to adhere to in the face of
potential legislation or federal regulation.  By empowering journal editors to screen,
review, and reject research papers on the basis of their weapons potential, advocates
hope to avoid new laws or regulations that might constrain the research process and
scientific productivity.  The revelation that some journal papers have been modified
because of ethical concerns raised through the editorial process has been seen as a
success for this style of oversight.125
Still, some cite the opinions of the editor of Science and chief executive of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science initially expressed regarding
the need for open publication126 as indicative that the publishing community is not
unified in perspective, and that an editor-based effort might yield unsatisfactory
results.  Even if domestic publishers develop a consensus protocol for handling
research results which might threaten national security, it is unclear if this would stop
such information from entering the open literature.  The competitive, international
nature of scientific publishing may lead foreign journals that lack such a protocol to
legally acquire and publish material that is prohibited from publication in domestic
journals.  Finally, with the growing ability to disseminate scientific information to
a wide audience without resorting to formal publication, it has been questioned
whether a publisher-based policy will be effective in restricting the dissemination of
contentious research.127
The National Research Council report Biotechnology Research in an Age of
Terrorism  recommends that journal editors continue to assess whether potentially
contentious manuscripts should be published.  It asserts that a voluntary approach,
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where scientists and editors can continue to refine and respond to criticism or other
input, is essential to the credibility of such a system within the research
community.128  Without such credibility it is believed that scientists may not take part
in potentially contentious biodefense research.
Federal Regulation
Prepublication Review of Sensitive, But Unclassified Results.  An
option viewed as potentially imminent by some in the scientific community is the
imposition by the federal government of sensitive, but unclassified status, such as
that being weighed by the Office of Management and Budget and discussed in the
Card memo, and subsequent prepublication review of scientific research resulting
from federal government sponsorship or funding.  Application of this standard would
likely allow scientists with appropriate credentials or need-to-know access to such
scientific literature, but would bar others’ access.  Advocates of such a standard point
out that such information could be transferred among scientists with fewer controls
than classified information.  It has been suggested that access to sensitive, but
unclassified research results could be controlled by the publisher through secure,
password-controlled websites.129  Other options might include dissemination of such
material via professional societies or directly from the federal government.
Opponents of such an approach cite the logistical difficulties in determining
those scientists with a bona fide reason for access to this information; determining
how and in what manner application of such a label would be implemented; and
determining how such sensitive, but unclassified material would be disseminated to
those scientists eligible to receive it.  A further complication is that the categorization
of what information might be sensitive, but unclassified is still not clear or uniformly
codified across all federal scientific funding agencies.130  Additionally, some
scientists or universities might choose not to participate in a process which would
determine access eligibility.  A Massachusetts Institute of Technology report rejects
such security reviews as potentially becoming arbitrary.131  
Another concern is the effectiveness of such a federally based review.  The
federal government funds about 26% of the total research and development efforts
in the United States.  In terms of basic and applied research, the federal government
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funds 49% and 26% respectively.132  If prepublication review resides within the
federal government, in contrast to a voluntary submission to professional societies
or an ethical or moral statement developed and overseen by journal publishers, then
less than half of all basic and applied research would be so reviewed.
A strong sentiment held by many members of the scientific community is that
all unclassified scientific results should be shared widely.  Results are sometimes
construed to include actual samples of research materials and all information
necessary to reproduce an experiment.  For example, the National Academy of
Sciences’ Board on Life Sciences has recommended that authors of scientific papers
allow unrestricted access to data and supporting materials related to published
findings.133  Such a position indicates a potential lack of support within the science
community for any credential system barring access to research results.
Lastly, universities fear that federal prepublication review to determine the
sensitive, but unclassified status of material in a publication might invalidate the
fundamental research exemption that such research results normally enjoy.  As a
consequence, university research done in an export-controlled area would no longer
be excluded from export control regulations.134
Security Review at the Funding Stage.  Another suggestion to addressing
research with security implications is to categorize such research at the funding stage,
rather than at the publication stage.135  Including voluntary or mandatory
prepublication review for federally-funded research or the development of new
funding opportunities containing prepublication review as a condition of acceptance
are potential remedies.  Individual funding vehicles have been offered to universities
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Opponents of this approach cite the general unwillingness that universities have
towards restricted research funding.137  Some universities have a policy barring
acceptance of federal funding requiring prepublication review.  Also, it is questioned
whether scientists are as willing to work in research areas where publication is not
allowed as in areas where publication is encouraged.138  As a consequence, the pool
of eligible scientists competing for federal funding would likely decrease, potentially
lowering the quality of research and development performed in these areas.
Additionally, it is considered difficult to determine at the funding stage whether
research will lead to sensitive results.  For example, the often cited mousepox
experiments were part of a fertility research program aimed at techniques for pest
control, and the results of the experiment were unexpected.139
Federal Licensing of Research.  Some experts have suggested that the role
of the federal government should be expanded beyond a gatekeeping role when
considering research.  Since much research that has potential terrorism concerns also
may play a role in biodefense, it has been suggested that such research should
continue, but only performed by select researchers at specific facilities.  For example,
Dr. John Steinbruner has suggested, as part of a Biological Research Security System,
that a national federal authority be established to license qualified researchers and
research facilities and oversee research by licensed researchers in licensed
facilities.140  Some scientists have asserted that licensing researchers, facilities, or
experiments would have a strong, negative impact on scientific productivity in those
areas.141
Oversight of Homeland Security-Related Research
Congress may continue to oversee development of policies relating to
publication of extramural research results funded by the Department of Homeland
Security’s Science and Technology directorate.  Whether the Department of
Homeland Security should adopt a currently existing policy on extramural research
or create a new policy; how this policy might be implemented; and the degree to
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which extramural research funded by the Department of Homeland Security might
present security concerns may be areas where further congressional direction occurs.
Additional oversight may focus on the activities underway in the Department
of Health and Human Services, where the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity has been established.  The charter of the NSABB is broad and
recommendations brought forth from the body may impact much federally funded,
homeland security-related research.  The degree of impact, the comprehensiveness
of such recommendations, and their ramifications may be areas of congressional
interest.  Alternately, should the NSABB be unable to provide practical
recommendations, the difficulties and barriers encountered by the board may draw
attention.
Concluding Observations
Developing policy in this area balances many concerns, some of which may be
more difficult to address than others.  How would a federal policy that encouraged
self-regulation of manuscript submissions, either by journal publishers or scientists,
be enforced?  How would the concerns of security officials regarding national
security be met if scientists are relied upon to review articles?  Conversely, how
would the concerns of scientists regarding scientific openness and academic freedom
be met if security officials review articles?  A policy involving review of research
may require the cooperation of members of both the scientific and security
community, two communities that generally have limited interaction.  Finally, how
would the success of a program controlling scientific research results be measured?
Some aspects of such a program, like the economic costs involved in processing the
articles, might be directly measurable, while others, such as the success in blocking
terrorist group access to this information, might not be so easily measured.
